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ABSTRACT 
The doctrine of equivalents is arguably one of the most 
important aspects of patent law.  The protection a patent confers is 
meaningless if its scope is determined to be so narrow that trivial 
changes to a device bring it out of the bounds of the patent.  One of 
the greatest challenges courts and legislatures therefore face in 
patent law is to create rules for determining patent scope that 
maintain the protection a patent is meant to confer while still 
keeping the patent monopoly within reasonable bounds.  Despite 
the general unity in patent laws among developed countries, the 
difficulty of this task has led to different results in different 
jurisdictions. Many jurisdictions have chosen to determine patent 
scope under a doctrine of equivalents, while others have 
maintained the position that adequate scope can be found within 
the meaning of a patent’s claim.  Even jurisdictions which agree 
that a doctrine of equivalents should apply differ significantly in its 
application.  This Article provides an examination of four patent 
jurisdictions—the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, 
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and Japan—and their separate answers to the question of patent 
scope.  This Article does not purport to decide which jurisdiction 
has the right solution, but merely points out that different solutions 
can be and have been found for the question of equivalents. 
Although a traditional case of patent infringement under the 
doctrine of equivalents may find protection under all four 
jurisdictions, the laws of these countries start to diverge on 
questions regarding after-arising technology, the essential 
elements of a patent claim, and equivalents that clearly fall outside 
the language of a claim.  One cannot answer the question, “Does 
anybody have it right?” without first considering these issues. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Most jurists the world over would concede that determining 
patent scope is one of the most difficult aspects of patent law. It is 
no wonder then that there are considerable differences in attitudes 
towards the doctrine of equivalents"a doctrine that is often central 
to the issue of patent scope"in different jurisdictions as it permits 
a court to find infringement even when the accused device or 
process is not literally covered by a valid claim of the patent. This 
Article will consider and compare such differences from the 
perspective of four key patent jurisdictions: the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan.  
In this Article, each jurisdiction is tackled separately by 
experts within that jurisdiction, and then their analysis is woven 
into one cohesive whole by posing the question: “Does anybody 
have it right?” 
 
II.  THE UNITED STATES 
A.  Judicial Underpinnings for the Doctrine of 
Equivalents 
The United States patent laws are found in Title 35 of the 
United States Code. Section 271 deals with infringement. 
However, a careful review of § 271 shows that it only codifies the 
statute on literal or textual infringement. The doctrine of 
equivalents is the result of case law, not statute.  
The doctrine of equivalents has its roots in the United 
States Supreme Court decision in Winans v. Denmead.1 The patent 
in Winans described a railcar with a conical cavity for carrying 
coal, resulting in an even weight distribution of coal in the car and 
a lower center of gravity. The accused railroad car had octagonal 
and pyramidal cavities instead, thus providing the same result as 
Winans’s railcar without falling within the literal language of 
Winans’s patent.2 The trial court found no infringement, but a 
sharply divided Supreme Court found infringement, applying the 
following logic: 
The exclusive right to the thing patented is not 
secured if the public are at liberty to make 
substantial copies of it, varying its form or 
proportions. And, therefore, the patentee, having 
described his invention, and shown its principles, 
and claimed it in that form which most perfectly 
embodies it, is, in contemplation of law, deemed to 
                                                
 
1 56 U.S. 330 (1853). 
2 See id. at 340. 
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claim every form in which his invention may be 
copied, unless he manifests an intention to disclaim 
some of those forms.3 
After the development of a modern claiming system, the 
doctrine of equivalents was firmly established in American law by 
the landmark decision of Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. 
Linde Air Products Co.
4
 (Graver Tank II). This case guided the 
United States doctrine of equivalents for almost the entire latter 
half of the twentieth century. The patent in Graver Tank II 
involved a welding process and claimed a welding flux5 containing 
a major proportion of alkaline earth metal silicate.6 The preferred 
embodiment disclosed in the patent was a flux that included a 
mixture of silicate of calcium and silicate of magnesium. The 
accused flux also used silicate of calcium, but substituted silicate 
of manganese (a non-alkaline earth metal), for silicate of 
magnesium. However, the patent specification taught that 
manganese, the metal used by the infringer, could be substituted 
for magnesium. 
The Court found that, although the accused flux did not 
infringe the claimed invention literally, it did infringe under the 
doctrine of equivalents. The Court indicated that “[t]he essence of 
the doctrine [of equivalents] is that one may not practice a fraud on 
a patent.”7 The Court explicitly likened this “essential” notion of 
“fraud on the patent” to the piracy of the “unscrupulous copyist”—
the scoundrel of copyright law.8 According to the Court, “[o]ne 
who seeks to pirate an invention, like one who seeks to pirate a 
copyrighted book or play, may be expected to introduce minor 
variations to conceal and shelter the piracy,” because “[o]utright 
and forthright duplication is a dull and very rare type of 
                                                
 
3 Id. at 343. 
4 339 U.S. 605 (1950); see Martin J. Adelman & Gary L. Francione, The 
Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law: Questions That Pennwalt Did Not 
Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 700-03 (1989). 
5 Welding flux is a blanket of molten metal compounds used to protect freshly 
deposited molten metal in the welding process, thereby producing sound weld 
metal.  See Linde Air Prods. Co. v. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 167 F.2d 531, 532-
33 (7th Cir. 1948), rev’d in part, 336 U.S. 271 (1949). 
6 The district court found the alkaline earth metal flux claims in question valid 
and infringed, but found other flux claims and all welding process claims to be 
invalid for technical reasons.  See Linde Air Prods. Co. v. Graver Tank & Mfg. 
Co., 86 F. Supp. 191, 199-200 (N.D. Ind. 1947). The court of appeals reversed, 
finding all of the claims in issue valid.  Linde Air Prods., 167 F.2d 531. The 
Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the district court’s 
decision.  See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co. (Graver Tank I), 
336 U.S. 271 (1949). The Court reheard the case in 1950 in Graver Tank II, 
which concerned infringement of the flux claims. 
7
 Graver Tank II, 339 U.S. at 608.  
8 See id. at 607. 
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infringement.” 9  Moreover, the Court suggested that only 
“insubstantial” changes would be encompassed by the doctrine.10 
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the test for infringement under the 
doctrine of equivalents: “a patentee may invoke this doctrine to 
proceed against the producer of a device ‘if it performs 
substantially the same function in substantially the same way to 
obtain the same result.’”11 
Noting that “[i]t is difficult to conceive of a case more 
appropriate for application of the doctrine of equivalents,”12 the 
Court affirmed the district court’s finding that the accused flux was 
substantially identical in operation and result. The Court focused 
specifically on evidence indicating that the prior art disclosed the 
use of manganese silicate as an ingredient in welding 
compositions, and that those skilled in the art would have regarded 
manganese silicate as interchangeable with magnesium silicate.13  
Graver Tank II was at the time and remains today a very 
unusual case on its facts since the accused flux was both disclosed 
and more significantly claimed in the patent, but the claims that 
covered the accused flux were held invalid. Hence the Court in 
Graver Tank II used the doctrine of equivalents only to expand a 
valid narrow claim to cover the accused flux that the inventor 
clearly considered to be within his patent claims. These special 
facts demonstrate that the public was put on notice in very clear 
terms that the inventor considered the accused flux to be an 
infringement.  
The doctrine of equivalents flourished, with broad 
application of the function/way/result test, after Graver Tank II, 
although none of the cases involved a patent with a claim covering 
the product or process alleged to be an equivalent.14 However, 
                                                
 
9 Id. The Court noted that the doctrine applied both to pioneer, or primary, 
inventions and to secondary inventions “consisting of a combination of old 
ingredients which produce new and useful results.” Id. at 608. According to the 
Court, “[w]hat constitutes equivalency must be determined against the context 
of the patent, the prior art, and the particular circumstances of the case,” and 
“[e]quivalence . . . is not the prisoner of a formula and is not an absolute to be 
considered in a vacuum.” Id. at 609.  Although “[a] finding of equivalence is a 
determination of fact” and “[p]roof can be made in any form,” the Court stressed 
that “[a]n important factor is whether persons reasonably skilled in the art would 
have known of the interchangeability of an ingredient not contained in the patent 
with one that was.” Id. 
10 See id. at 610. 
11 Id. at 608 (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 
(1929)). 
12 Graver Tank II, 339 U.S. at 612. 
13 Id. 
14 An extensive discussion of the post-Graver equivalence cases is found in 
Adelman & Francione, supra note 4. This article takes the reader to the late 
1980s. The authors are still not aware of any case where the alleged equivalent 
11 Yale J.L. & Tech. 261              2008-2009 
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nearly fifty years later, the Court chose to reconsider the doctrine 
in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.15 In doing 
so, the Court held that the doctrine still lived, but it indicated that 
every element of a claim is material and the function/way/result 
test for equivalents must be applied to each individual element and 
not to the claim as a whole.16 In addition, the Court indicated that 
each element must not be so construed as to “effectively eliminate 
that element in its entirety.”17 The Court then reaffirmed the 
doctrine of prosecution history estoppel as a limitation on the 
doctrine of equivalents, 18  decided that equivalency should be 
decided at the time of infringement,19 and suggested the use of 
special questions of interrogatories as a means for dealing with 
black box jury verdicts.20 The Court did not attempt to provide a 
theory for why the doctrine exists beyond that found in Graver 
Tank II. 
Although the Supreme Court did not set forth a justification 
for the doctrine of equivalents in Graver Tank II, it seems to have 
adopted the justification provided by Federal Circuit Judge Rader. 
In a case involving the doctrine of dedication,21 Judge Rader wrote 
a lengthy concurring opinion which set forth a theory upon which 
to base a sound doctrine of equivalents.22 Judge Rader suggested a 
simple principle to incorporate both the doctrine’s notice function, 
ensuring that the definition of an invention can be found in its 
claims, and it’s protective function, protecting the inventor from 
insubstantial variations he could not have thought to include: 
“[T]he doctrine of equivalents does not capture subject matter that 
the patent drafter reasonably could have foreseen during the 
application process and included in the claims.”23  
 
B.  The Unforeseeable Equivalent Rule of Festo 
Taking a cue from Judge Rader, the Court in Festo Corp. v. 
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.
24 essentially adopted his 
                                                                                                         
 
was covered by an existing patent claim which was subsequently invalidated 
thereby forcing the patent owner to use a narrower claim plus the doctrine of 
equivalents for its infringement case. 
15 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
16 Id. at 29-30. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 32. 
19 Id. at 37. 
20 Id. at 39. 
21 The doctrine that holds that a disclosed but unclaimed embodiment in the 
patent cannot be recaptured by the doctrine of equivalents.  
22 Johnson & Johnston Assocs. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1056-59 
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
23 Id. at 1056. 
24 535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
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foreseeability approach, but only when the inventor seeks to 
overcome what otherwise would be a prosecution history estoppel. 
The Court recognized that usually a “patentee’s decision to narrow 
his claims through amendment may be presumed to be a general 
disclaimer of the territory between the original claim and the 
amended claim.”25 However, even if a patentee narrows a claim, he 
may rebut the presumption by showing that “at the time of the 
amendment one skilled in the art could not reasonably be expected 
to have drafted a claim that would have literally encompassed the 
alleged equivalent.” 26  Specifically, the Court stated that the 
patentee can rebut the presumption that prosecution history 
estoppel bars a finding of equivalence if: 
The equivalent may have been unforeseeable at the 
time of the application; the rationale underlying the 
amendment may bear no more than a tangential 
relation to the equivalent in question; or there may 
be some other reason suggesting that the patentee 
could not reasonably be expected to have described 
the insubstantial substitute in question.27 
The Court, however, did not explain the meaning of the 
phrase “a tangential relation to the equivalent in question.”28 It also 
did not explain when “there may be some other reason suggesting 
that the patentee could not reasonably be expected to have 
described the insubstantial substitute in question.”29 As for the 
latter condition, no subsequent case has found it a basis for 
overcoming the presumption and nobody in the literature has 
proposed even a hypothetical situation where it would apply.30 As 
for “tangential,” it is totally devoid of linguistic content as applied 
to patent law instead of geometry or differential calculus. It 
apparently came out of nowhere (probably the result of a law 
clerk’s feeble attempt at making a contribution to the law). The 
                                                
 
25 Id. at 725. 
26 Id. 
27
Id. at 740-41. Afterwards, the Federal Circuit held that “the time when the 
narrowing amendment was made, and not when the application was filed, is the 
relevant time for evaluating unforeseeability, for that is when the patentee 
presumptively surrendered the subject matter in question and it is at that time 
that foreseeability is relevant.” Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo 
Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1365 n.2 (Fed Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
28 Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 740. 
29 Id. at 740-41. 
30 The Federal Circuit has suggested that this criterion “may be satisfied when 
there was some reason, such as the shortcomings of language, why the patentee 
was prevented from describing the alleged equivalent when it narrowed the 
claim.” Festo, 344 F.3d at 1370. 
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Federal Circuit has found that an amendment was tangential in 
only a very few cases.31  
More importantly, the Court did not explain why this 
reasonably foreseeable approach to the doctrine of equivalents 
should only apply to amended claim elements.32 After all, an 
applicant normally considers the same legal and factual issues 
when deciding how to draft her originally filed claims as when 
deciding whether to amend claims during prosecution. In Celltech 
Chiroscience Ltd. v. MedImmune Inc.,33 Lord Justice Jacob, one 
the world’s leading patent jurists, had to decide an infringement 
question under U.S. patent law. In the course of doing so, he 
commented on the Court’s explanation for its approach to 
overcoming an estoppel: 
Perhaps of most significance in this case, even if 
file wrapper estoppel did not apply, is the 
observation that “the patentee . . . may be expected 
to draft claims encompassing readily known 
equivalents.” Does this apply also to unamended 
claims? Suppose, for instance, an unamended claim 
which says “nailed.” And suppose screwed, riveted 
or glued would do just as well. Are those 
equivalents not covered by the doctrine of 
equivalents? Putting it another way is it only 
unforeseeable equivalents which are now covered 
by the doctrine?
34
 
Lord Justice Jacob therefore recognized an inherent 
inconsistency in the doctrine of equivalents in the United States as 
currently understood. If there is a prosecution history estoppel with 
respect to a claim element, then the only equivalent permitted for 
such an element is one that is not reasonably foreseeable, i.e. most 
often an after-arising equivalent unless somehow the estoppel was 
tangential. In short, it is unforgiving of patent attorney errors made 
during the prosecution of the patent if they result in the narrowing 
of claim elements, but not of patent attorney decisions made during 
the drafting of the originally filed claims. 
The unforeseeable equivalents rule in Festo brings about 
other inconsistencies in United States law as well. The current 
function/way/result tripartite test is a test for determining 
equivalency applying an element-by-element analysis. However, 
                                                
 
31 See the concurring opinion of Judge Rader in Cross Medical Products, Inc. v. 
Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 480 F.3d 1335, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Rader, 
J., concurring), which discusses the two cases that have found that the 
amendment was tangential and explaining why this requirement was unwise. 
32 Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 740-41. 
33 [2002] EWHC 2167 (Pat.) (Eng.). 
34 Id. ¶ 18. 
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Festo brings out a weakness in this test.35 The way prong, in many 
cases the most contentious issue for the determination of 
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents,36 represents the 
“order” (i.e., the interrelationship in time space, dimensions, etc.37) 
of the elements.38 An element that is the product of an after-arising 
technology and adapted for use in a product or process would 
likely result in a different “order,” particularly spatial arrangement, 
among the elements of the product or process. Arguably, a 
potential infringer of a claimed product or process could 
circumvent infringement under the doctrine of equivalents by 
replacing an element in an accused product or process with an 
element that is the product of an after-arising technology.  
 
C.  Conclusion 
In any event, it is clear that in the United States an element 
subject to a prosecution history estoppel is subject to the 
reasonably foreseeable limitation whereas an element that is not 
may be expanded by any known or unknown equivalent. Whether 
the United States will adopt the reasonably foreseeable approach 
for all limitations is for the courts in the future to decide. At 
present there is no reason to believe that the current approach that 
differentiates limitations based on whether or not they are subject 
to a prosecution history estoppel will be changed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 
35 See Raj S. Davé, A Mathematical Approach to Claim Elements and the 
Doctrine of Equivalents, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 507, 540-43 (2003). 
36
 See Adelman & Francione, supra note 4, at 687-88 (“In Pennwalt, as in most 
equivalents cases, there was no dispute that the accused device performed 
substantially the same overall function or work and achieved substantially the 
same overall result. In most cases, the issue is almost invariably whether the 
accused device performs the overall function in substantially the same way as 
the claimed invention.” (citations omitted)). 
37 See Davé, supra note 35, at 534. 
38
 See id. at 537. 
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III.  THE UNITED KINGDOM
39
 
A.  Introduction 
In Kirin-Amgen v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd., 40  the 
ruling decision of the House of Lords, Lord Hoffmann was openly 
skeptical of the U.S. doctrine of equivalents remarking that 
“American patent litigants pay dearly for results which are no more 
just or predictable than could be achieved by simply reading the 
claims.” Lord Hoffmann argued that giving claims a “purposive” 
construction eliminates any need for a doctrine of equivalents. 
While the late Sir Hugh Laddie argued that Lord Hoffmann 
misread prior English precedents, even he conceded that current 
English law does not provide for any protection against 
“equivalents”.41  
This chapter examines the “purposive construction” 
approach under English law and the contours of Article 69 of the 
European Patent Convention (EPC), with which English law is 
meant to comply. It finds that under the current English approach 
where the need to provide adequate notice of patent breadth to the 
public is balanced against fair protection to the patentee, a claim 
cannot be read literally, but is to be construed purposively in 
accordance with the specification and drawings. The law clearly 
states that in order for a variant or an equivalent to infringe, such 
variant or equivalent must fall within the language of a claim. In 
other words, an equivalent that does not fall within the language of 
a claim, however interpreted, is not caught, despite the fact that 
such variant may amount to nothing more than an unfair copying 
of the very essence of the inventive concept.  
The chapter then examines the amended language of the 
EPC2000 (which came into force in 2007) and argues that it is 
unlikely to change the law governing equivalents in the United 
Kingdom.  
                                                
 
39 This chapter was begun by Lord Justice Pumfrey, who unfortunately passed 
away in December 2007. It was completed by Shamnad Basheer. While great 
efforts were taken to adhere to the key structure outlined by Justice Pumfrey, the 
author has, at times, strayed to bring in other issues that deserve discussion, 
including the contours of Article 69 of the European Patent Convention, and the 
prospect of changed interpretation in the light of EPC 2000. See Convention on 
the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention), art. 69, Oct. 5, 
1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 255, 275-76 [hereinafter EPC], available at 
http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/html/epc/2000/e/ma1.html.  Mr. 
Basheer wishes to thank Justine Pila and Duncan Curley for their helpful 
comments on this section. 
40 [2004] UKHL 46, ¶ 44. 
41  Hugh Laddie, Kirin Amgen—The End of Equivalents in England?, 40 
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITION LAW 
[IIC] 3, 6 (2009) (F.G.R.). 
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B.  Drafting Difficulties 
A discussion of equivalents should start with the difficulties 
confronted by the draftsman, particularly where the rule is “first to 
file” rather than “first to invent.” Speed (coupled with secrecy) is 
everything. Once the invention is made, it is of the greatest 
importance to file an application as soon as possible. A patent 
attorney is confronted with an invention. He must discuss it with 
the inventor. He must rely on his own knowledge of the technology 
and the guidance he receives from the inventor and others to draft a 
document that must, if it is to form the basis of a valid claim to 
priority, contain an enabling disclosure of the invention. 42 
Appropriate claim categories must be decided on, and all this must 
be done in the knowledge that one cannot subsequently amend the 
patent specification to add subject-matter. At the same time, the 
patent attorney will wish to secure as wide protection as possible 
having regard to the state of the art, because that is his basic 
function. So the burden on the draftsman is a heavy one. 
The task of the draftsman will thus be to draft claims as 
wide as possible without bumping into the prior art, but at the same 
time to disclose the features of the invention with differing degrees 
of generality to provide, if necessary, stages in the inevitable 
narrowing of the claims during prosecution. The result will be 
dictated by one consideration above all else: how wide is it 
possible to claim having regard to the state of the art. In this 
drafting process, it is hardly surprising that draftsmen will use 
words of degree, and perhaps for fear of the examiner, will fail 
fully to generalize features of the invention as widely as the state 
of the art may justify. Of course, they may just be bad at their job.  
These difficulties indicate that the perfect patent claim will 
often remain an unattainable ideal. Thus most patent jurisdictions 
agree that the law ought not to penalize omissions in drafting, 
particularly when such an omission spurs a competitor to 
appropriate the essence of an invention through minor variants that 
may not technically fall within the strict literal wordings of a 
claim. However, the tests laid down by courts for determining 
when such variants are likely to fall within the scope of a patent 
monopoly, despite omissions in drafting are allegedly different. 
The United Kingdom’s test takes the form of a “purposive” 
construction approach that is more limited in scope than the 
corresponding doctrine of equivalents in the United States.  
                                                
 
42 Compare Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 5 (priority date), id. § 14 (making of 
application), id. § 14(3) (adequacy of disclosure), and id. § 15 (date of filing 
application), with European Patent Convention art. 78, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 
268 (requirements of the European patent application), id. art. 80 (date of filing), 
id. art. 83 (disclosure of the invention), and id. art. 88 (claiming priority). 
11 Yale J.L. & Tech. 261              2008-2009 
 273 
C.  Summary of the English Approach 
There are two versions of the history of the English 
approach to equivalents. One is that laid out by Lord Hoffmann in 
Kirin-Amgen. 43  The other is described by the late Sir Hugh 
Laddie.44  However, both agree that the doctrine of purposive 
construction articulated by Lord Diplock in the famous Catnic 
case45 represents the current law.46 Given that Lord Hoffman’s 
views were expressed in his judicial capacity sitting in the House 
of Lords, the highest court in the United Kingdom, this view will 
hold sway insofar current English law in this regard. 
In Amgen, Lord Hoffman not only endorsed the Catnic 
approach as a correct statement of the English position, but also 
claimed that it conforms to the EPC mandate on claim 
interpretation.47  
 
1.  Catnic 
In Catnic, the invention pertained to a “steel girder” lintel 
used in the construction of doors and windows. The claim required 
that the upper plate be supported upon the lower plate by two rigid 
supports, one in the front and the other “extending vertically” from 
the one plate to the other at the rear.48 The defendant deployed a 
lintel with a rear support that was inclined six or eight degrees 
from vertical.49 The House of Lords ruled that this variation had no 
material effect upon the load-bearing capacity of the lintel or the 
way it worked and that this would have been obvious to the skilled 
builder at the date of publication of the patent.50 Importantly, it 
also held that the skilled reader would not have understood the 
claim to mean that the patentee was insisting upon precisely ninety 
degrees as an essential requirement of his invention. The court 
therefore concluded that “extending vertically” meant extending 
with the range of angles which give substantially the maximum 
load-bearing capacity and of which ninety degrees is the perfect 
example”.51 The court stated: 
A patent specification should be given a purposive 
construction rather than a purely literal one derived 
                                                
 
43 Kirin-Amgen, [2004] UKHL 46, [2005] R.P.C. 9. 
44 See Laddie, supra note 41. 
45 Catnic Components Ltd. v. Hill & Smith Ltd., [1982] R.P.C. 183 (H.L.). 
46 See Kirin-Amgen, [2004] UKHL 46, ¶¶ 42-45; Laddie, supra note 41, at 10-
11. 
47 Kirin-Amgen, [2004] UKHL 46, ¶ 44. 
48 Catnic, [1982] R.P.C. at 240. 
49 Id. at 241. 
50 Id. at 244. 
51 Id. at 244. 
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from applying to it the kind of meticulous verbal 
analysis in which lawyers are too often tempted by 
their training to indulge. The question in each case 
is: whether persons with practical knowledge and 
experience of the kind of work in which the 
invention was intended to be used, would 
understand that strict compliance with a particular 
descriptive word or phrase appearing in a claim was 
intended by the patentee to be an essential 
requirement of the invention so that any variant 
would fall outside the monopoly claimed, even 
though it could have no material effect upon the 
way the invention worked.52 
 
2.  Improver 
In Improver Corp. v. Remington Consumer Products Ltd.,53 
Mr. Justice Hoffmann (as he then was) restated Lord Diplock’s 
purposive construction approach as a sequence of three questions 
to be asked whenever the alleged infringement fell outside the 
“primary, literal or a contextual meaning” of the word or phrase in 
question: 
(1) Does the variant have a material effect upon the 
way the invention works? If yes, the variant is 
outside the claim. If no— 
(2) Would this (i.e. that the variant had no material 
effect) have been obvious at the date of publication 
of the patent to a reader skilled in the art. If no, the 
variant is outside the claim. If yes— 
(3) Would the reader skilled in the art nevertheless 
have understood from the language of the claim that 
the patentee intended that strict compliance with the 
primary meaning was an essential requirement of 
the invention. If yes, the variant is outside the 
claim.54 
 Improver is one of a series of cases 55  involving 
infringement of a European patent corresponding to the U.S. ‘772 
patent56 that covered a motorized depilatory known as the Epilady. 
It essentially used a coiled spring attached at both ends to a motor. 
                                                
 
52 Id. at 243. 
53 [1990] Fleet Street Reports [F.S.R.] 181 (Pat. Ct.). 
54 Id. at 189. 
55 A list of all of the cases may be found in John Gladstone Mills III, A 
Transnational Convention for the Acquisition and Enforcement on International 
Patent Rights, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 958, 960 n.10 (2006). 
56 U.S. Patent No. 4,524,772 (filed July 22, 1983). 
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The motor drives one end of the spring clockwise and the other end 
counterclockwise and the rotating curved spring pulls out hair. The 
Epilady was a great commercial success. The accused device sold 
under the name Smooth and Silky was the subject of the ‘375 
patent. 57  It essentially substituted a plastic (rubber) tube with 
grooves for the coiled spring. It was specifically designed to 
improve on the Epilady design.58  
A key issue in the application of the Improver questions 
was how one was to determine obviousness for purposes of 
answering the second question. Mr. Justice Hoffman opined thus: 
In my view the question supposes that the skilled 
man is told of both the invention and the variant and 
asked whether the variant would obviously work in 
the same way. An affirmative answer would not be 
inconsistent with the variant being an inventive 
step. For example, the choice of some material for 
the bendy rod which was a priori improbable (e.g. 
on account of its expense) but had been discovered 
to give some additional advantage (e.g. painless 
extraction) might be a variant which obviously 
worked in the same way as the invention and yet be 
an inventive step. Nor would it matter that the 
material in question, being improbable, would not 
have suggested itself to the skilled man as an 
obvious alternative. Questions such as these may be 
relevant to the question of construction (Lord 
                                                
 
57 U.S. Patent No. 4,726,375 (filed Mar. 30, 2987). 
58 The independent claim of the European patent corresponding to the ‘772 
patent reads:  
An electrically powered depilatory device comprising: a hand 
held portable housing (2); motor means (4, 4’) disposed in said 
housing; and a helical spring (24) comprising a plurality of 
adjacent windings arranged to be driven by said motor means 
in rotational sliding motion relative to skin bearing hair to be 
removed, said helical spring (24) including an arcuate hair 
engaging portion arranged to define a convex side whereas the 
windings are spread apart and a concave side corresponding 
thereto wherea[s] the windings are pressed together, the 
rotational motion of the helical spring (24) producing 
continuous motion of the windings from a spread apart 
orientation at the convex side to a pressed together orientation 
on the concave side and for the engagement and plucking of 
hair from the skin of the subject, where by the surface 
velocities of the windings relative to the skin greatly exceed 
the surface velocity of the housing relative thereto. 
Improver, [1990] F.S.R. at  185 (quoting language from the patent). 
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Diplock’s third question) but not at this stage of the 
inquiry.59 
Another important aspect of the case is the court’s 
treatment of the third question which focuses on the intent of the 
inventor as evidenced by the patent specification. Therefore, it 
provided a basis for a court to decide not to expand a claim on the 
theory that the patentee did not want the claim to be so expanded. 
That is precisely what Mr. Justice Hoffmann did in Improver with 
respect to question three, where he refused to expand the claim 
even though the specification indicated that equivalents were 
included. 
Thus interpreted, I do not think that “helical spring” 
can reasonably be given a wide generic construction 
and I accept Dr. Laming’s reasons for thinking that 
a skilled man would not understand it in this sense. 
This is not a case like Catnic in which the angle of 
the support member can be regarded as an 
approximation to the vertical. The rubber rod is not 
an approximation to a helical spring. It is a different 
thing which can in limited circumstances work in 
the same way.60 
 
3.  Amgen: The End of the Improver Questions? 
The last Improver question asks if the skilled person might, 
even if the variant works in obviously the same way as the 
patented invention, still construe the patent claim in a narrow 
manner such that the variant is excluded from its ambit. One is 
hard pressed to see why one has to necessarily go through the two 
earlier Improver steps in all cases before asking this critical third 
question, which amounts to nothing more than asking: how would 
a skilled person have construed the term? Put another way, in 
many cases, it is far more economical to go directly to the third 
question, which in essence is what the Catnic purposive 
construction approach is all about.61 This logic is evident on the 
facts of Improver itself. Mr. Justice Hoffman ought to have simply 
asked: would the skilled person have construed the term “helical 
spring” as used in the patent specification to include a rubber rod? 
The answer is likely to have been a clear no. 
And this is precisely what Lord Hoffman did in Amgen, by 
which time he had been elevated to the House of Lords, the highest 
                                                
 
59 Id. at 192. 
60 Id. at 197.  
61 Of course in some cases, it is not possible to “purposively construe” without 
asking the first two questions 
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court in the United Kingdom.62 He strongly cautioned that the 
Improver guidelines were not to be ritualistically applied in every 
case.63 
One can see parallels between Lord Hoffman’s subsequent 
approach to the Improver guidelines and the U.S. Supreme court’s 
view of the “suggestion motivation teaching” test evolved by the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to determine the 
obviousness or otherwise of an invention.64 In both cases, the 
courts warned against a dogmatic application of the standard or 
guideline in question, stipulating that while they might help in 
some cases, other cases could be resolved using the usual tests 
developed by earlier case law. 
In some cases, the first two Improver questions may help 
one construe the claim in accordance with what the skilled person 
might have thought. But here again, although the variant may not 
materially impact the manner in which the patented invention 
works and this is obvious to a person skilled in the art, the said 
variant must fall within the language of the claim.  In other words, 
the first two questions by themselves, without the third, might 
bring English law closer to the U.S. position which permits 
protection against an equivalent that falls outside the language of a 
claim. 
The facts of Amgen are as follows. Of the thirty-one claims 
in the Amgen patent,65 only three were treated as relevant. These 
claims (1, 19 and 26) can be briefly summarized as follows:  
Claim 1: A DNA sequence for use in securing the 
expression of erythropoietin (EPO) in a host cell, 
such sequence selected from tables in the patent or 
related sequences;66  
Claim 19: EPO which is the product of the 
expression of an exogenous DNA sequence, and 
which has a higher molecular weight by the ‘SDS-
                                                
 
62 See Kirin-Amgen v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd., [2004] UKHL 46, [2005] 
R.P.C. 9, ¶ 48 (“The Catnic principle of construction is therefore in my opinion 
precisely in accordance with the Protocol.”). 
63 See id. ¶ 52 (“The limits to the value of the guidelines are perhaps most 
clearly illustrated by the present case . . . .”). For a good discussion of some of 
the cases that applied the Improver questions, see Jenkins, Trade Mark and 
Patent Attorneys, Court of Appeal Gets to Grips with the Protocol, 
http://www.jenkins.eu/pi-autumn-2002/court-of-appeal-gets-to-grips-with-the-
protocol.asp 
64
 See KSR v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398 (2007) 
65 See European Patent No. 0148605B2 (filed Dec. 12, 1984); Kirin-Amgen, 
[2004] UKHL 46, ¶ 12. 
66 Kirin-Amgen, [2004] UKHL 46, ¶ 13. 
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PAGE’ testing method than existing EPO derived 
from extraction from urine;67 and 
Claim 26: EPO which is the product of the 
expression in a host cell of a DNA sequence 
according to claim 1.68 
It must be noted at this juncture that the issue of 
infringement of the DNA sequence itself (claim 1) never arose 
directly, as the alleged infringement was by importation of the 
EPO product"the subject matter of claims 19 and 26. However it 
did arise indirectly, since claim 26 referred back to claim 1.69 
The key issue in determining the scope of the patent was 
the construction of the term ‘host cell’ as used in claim 26 (and 
claim 1).70 In order to understand the court’s resolution of this 
issue, it is important to appreciate the difference underlying the 
two technologies. While Amgen’s process for the manufacture of 
EPO relied on an exogenous DNA sequence coding for EPO 
(which was introduced into the host cell), the TKT method 
involved gene activation of an endogenous DNA sequence by an 
exogenous upstream control sequence.71 
On the evidence, the House of Lords concluded that the 
skilled person would not regard TKT’s process using an 
endogenous coding sequence to produce GA-EPO as involving a 
‘host cell,’ required by claim 1.72 Consequently, TKT’s GA-EPO 
was not an EPO falling within claim 26. Similarly, the court held 
that GA-EPO was not “the product of … expression of an 
exogenous DNA sequence’ within claim 19, and so there was no 
infringement under this claim as well.”73 
Much in line with its principle of construction outlined 
earlier, Lord Hoffman made it abundantly clear that this is where 
the analysis should end. The claim had been construed 
‘purposively’, and on the facts there was no infringement. He 
specifically disapproved of any further attempt to apply the 
protocol questions over and above that construction.74  
 
4.  After-Arising Technologies 
As to whether or not a variant created using an after-arising 
technology is likely to infringe under the purposive construction 
                                                
 
67 Id. ¶ 14. 
68 Id. ¶ 15. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. ¶ 53. 
71 Id. ¶ 10. 
72 Id. ¶¶ 58, 80. 
73 Id. ¶ 58. 
74 Id. ¶ 70. 
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approach depends upon the level of generality of the claim in issue. 
Illustratively, consider a claim that used the term “electronic 
storage device” and had been published during the era of CDs, 
when DVD technology was not yet known. It is reasonable to 
suggest that the term “electronic storage device” ought to be 
construed to include DVD technology as well. As Lord Hoffman 
noted in Amgen: 
I do not dispute that a claim may, upon its proper 
construction, cover products or processes which 
involve the use of technology unknown at the time 
the claim was drafted. . . . In the present case, 
however . . . the man skilled in the art would not 
have understood the claim as sufficiently general to 
include gene activation. He would have understood 
it to be limited to the expression of an exogenous 
DNA sequence which coded for EPO.75 
In other words, unless the claim is general enough to cover 
variants that deploy after-arising technology, without running the 
risk of being invalidated for lack of sufficient disclosure or 
enablement,76 it may not be possible to construe such a claim to 
include the said variant. What makes the issue of after-arising 
technology more difficult to cover in the English context is the fact 
that the skilled person is to construe the claim as on the date of the 
publication of the patent application.77 Therefore, such person does 
not have the benefit of the after-arising technology with which to 
construe such a claim and thereby to include a variant within its 
scope.78 
 
 
 
                                                
 
75 Id. ¶ 53. 
76 See Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 14(5)(c) (U.K.), which tallies with the EPC, 
supra note 39, art. 84, 1065 U.N.T.S. at 279, and requires that “[t]he claim or 
claims shall be supported by the description.” Of course, the lack of enablement 
would not impact the scope of the claim during a “purposive constructive” 
assessment, but may result in the claim being invalidated separately. 
77 The second Improver question asks: “Would this (i.e. that the variant had no 
material effect) have been obvious at the date of publication of the patent to a 
reader skilled in the art[?]” Improver Corp. v. Remington Consumer Prods. Ltd. 
[1990] F.S.R. 181, 189 (Pat. Ct.).77 
78 Lord Justice Jacob, a leading English IP judge  is also unsympathetic to the 
idea of protecting an unforeseeable equivalent. See Lord Justice Jacob, Claim 
Construction and Equivalents: A Paper for the Shanghai IP Symposium (July 
2008) (manuscript at 5-6), available at 
http://121.199.41.177/QBPC/uploads/download/Claim%20Construction%20and
%20Equivalents%20_by%20Justice%20Jacob.doc. 
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D. The EPC and Protocol: Delineating the Contours 
Lord Hoffman categorically asserted that the modern 
English approach to the interpretation of claims and infringement 
(as articulated by the Catnic “purposive construction” approach) is 
in conformity with Article 69 of the EPC and the corresponding 
Protocol.79 This statement assumes tremendous significance, given 
that English law cannot travel beyond the bounds of the EPC. 
Consequently, there are limits to any potential expansion of the 
purposive construction approach to accommodate variants or 
equivalents. 
Article 69 EPC has two parts: a substantive part, and a 
‘Protocol’ (agreement) on its interpretation. The substantive part 
states that “[t]he extent of the protection conferred by a European 
patent or a European patent application shall be determined by the 
terms of the claims. Nevertheless, the description and drawings 
shall be used to interpret the claims.”80 
The Protocol then goes on to elaborate: 
Article 69 should not be interpreted as meaning that 
the extent of the protection conferred by a European 
patent is to be understood as that defined by the 
strict, literal meaning of the wording used in the 
claims, the description and drawings being 
employed only for the purpose of resolving an 
ambiguity found in the claims. Nor should it be 
taken to mean that the claims serve only as a 
guideline and that the actual protection conferred 
may extend to what, from a consideration of the 
description and drawings by a person skilled in the 
art, the patent proprietor has contemplated. On the 
contrary, it is to be interpreted as defining a position 
between these extremes which combines a fair 
protection for the patent proprietor with a 
reasonable degree of legal certainty for third 
parties.81 
In so far as English law is concerned, section 125 of the 
Patents Act, 1977 mirrors Article 69: 
(1) [A]n invention for a patent for which an 
application has been made or for which a patent has 
been granted shall, unless the context otherwise 
                                                
 
79 Kirin-Amgen, [2004] UKHL 46, ¶ 30. 
80  EPC, supra note 39, art. 69(1), 1065 U.N.T.S. at 275, available at 
http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/html/epc/2000/e/ar69.html. 
81 European Patent Convention, Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69, art. 
1, Nov. 29, 2000, available at http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-
texts/html/epc/2000/e/ma2a.html. 
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requires, be taken to be that specified in a claim of 
the specification of the application or patent, . . . as 
interpreted by the description and any drawings 
contained in that specification, and the extent of the 
protection conferred by a patent shall be determined 
accordingly. 
. . .  
(3) The Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 
of the European Patent Contention . . . shall . . . 
apply for the purposes of subsection (1) above as it 
applies for the purposes of that Article.82 
In order to appreciate the import of Article 69, as 
interpreted by the Protocol, consider the following categories: 
 
(i) Where the literal meaning of a term used in the claim is 
 not clear: 
In such a case, the straightforward principle of claim 
construction that is followed in European countries and indeed in 
most other jurisdictions around the world is to look to the 
specification and drawings to interpret the claim. Illustratively, in 
Catnic, one might argue that the import of the term “vertical” was 
not clear from the claims. Therefore, it could either be construed as 
“ninety degrees” or as something distinct from horizontal and 
therefore “representing a close range of degrees that was close to 
ninety degrees.” One would then look to the specification and the 
drawings, which made it clear that the patentee did not intend to 
restrict the term to only ninety degrees, but wished to include a 
range of degrees close to ninety degrees.83 
 
(ii) Where the literal meaning of a term used in the claim is 
 clear. However, when one looks to the specification and 
 drawings, another meaning appears: 
In such a case, Article 69 as interpreted by the Protocol 
demands that the term should be invested with the meaning that 
emerges from the specification and the drawings. One might argue 
that the Catnic “vertical” usage falls within this category, as 
opposed to the earlier one discussed above. In other words, the 
term vertical used in the claims would have strictly meant ninety 
degrees. This is buttressed by the fact that the patentee used the 
term “substantially horizontal” in the same claim and omitted to 
use the term “substantially” in relation to “vertical.”84  
                                                
 
82 Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 125 (1977) (Eng.). 
83 Catnic Components Ltd. v. Hill & Smith Ltd., [1982] R.P.C. 183, 244. 
84 Id. 
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However, on an examination of the specification and the 
drawings, a person skilled in the art was likely to appreciate that 
the absence of the qualifying term “substantially” was inadvertent 
and that the term “vertical” meant a range of degrees close to 
ninety degrees. Under the EPC and the protocol, it is this reading 
of the claim that must prevail. In other words, although the literal 
meaning may be clear, one cannot interpret it in clinical isolation 
and must necessarily look to the specifications and drawings. This 
category best exemplifies the essence of the “purposive 
construction” doctrine.  
 
(iii) Where the literal meaning of a claim term is clear, and 
 the specification does nothing to indicate that the term 
 includes the allegedly infringing variant: 
In such a case, both the EPC and English law (which 
conform in this regard) are likely to exclude any protection to the 
variant. It again bears reiteration that Article 69 stipulates that the 
meaning of a term has to be found in the claims.85 And this is 
where English law differs from other jurisdictions, which explicitly 
recognize a doctrine of equivalents or other similar doctrine, where 
one need not necessarily fit the variant within the language of the 
claim.  
This category is well illustrated in Amgen, where the term 
“host cell” used in the claims could not have meant an ordinary 
human cell with an exogenous promoter.86 Under English law, the 
relevant date for assessing how the skilled person might have 
construed the claim is the date of publication of the patent. In 
Amgen, as of the date of publication of the patent, TKT’s 
endogenous gene activation technology was not yet discovered or 
contemplated.87 Consequently, it is difficult to argue that a term 
such as “host cell” used in the claim could be taken to include 
TKT’s process where no “host cell” was used.  
This category exemplifies the outer limits of the purposive 
construction doctrine and helps strike a distinction with the U.S. 
position, where a variant does not need to be bound to the language 
of a claim in order for the patentee to be protected. While 
discussing the U.S. doctrine of equivalents, Lord Hoffman opined 
that “once the monopoly had been allowed to escape from the 
terms of the claims, it is not easy to know where its limits should 
                                                
 
85  See EPC, art. 69(1), available at http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-
texts/html/epc/2000/e/ar69.html. 
86 Kirin-Amgen v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd., [2004] UKHL 46, [2005] 
R.P.C. 9. 
87 Id. ¶ 79. 
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be drawn.” 88  Lord Hoffman observed that the Supreme Court’s 
worry in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. that 
the doctrine of equivalents had “taken on a life of its own, 
unbounded by the patent claims” 89 seemed to be true.90 
The above categories are not neat divisions and may 
perhaps morph into each other. Imperfect as they are, they 
demonstrate the analytical distinctions sought to be drawn and help 
one to appreciate the import of Article 69 and purposive 
construction. 
 
1.  EPC 2000 
In the light of revisions to the EPC and the use of the term 
“equivalents” for the first time, the above interpretation may be 
thrown into some doubt. The revisions effected by the European 
Patent Convention (EPC 2000) and the corresponding protocol 
came into force on December 13, 2007. The amended protocol 
now has two parts: 
Article 1, the first part, reproduces the existing Protocol 
requirement. Article 2, interestingly titled “Equivalents”, states 
that, “[f]or the purpose of determining the extent of protection 
conferred by a European patent, due account shall be taken of any 
element which is equivalent to an element specified in the claims.” 
Since Article 2 uses the term “equivalent”, one might ask 
whether or not the EPC now protects “equivalents” that lie outside 
the language of the claim, but nonetheless fall within the scope of 
the inventive concept. It may be noted that neither the term 
“equivalent” nor any of the other terms used in this Article (“due 
account,” “element,” “specified”) have been defined.  
Firstly, it is clear that Article 69, which stipulates that “the 
extent of the protection conferred by a patent or a European patent 
application shall be determined by the terms of the claims,” would 
still reign supreme.  It is only the protocol which interprets Article 
69 that has changed and not Article 69 itself. As discussed earlier, 
Article 69 makes clear that one cannot travel beyond the language 
of a claim. This is further clarified by the amended wordings of 
Article 69(2) which now states that: 
For the period up to grant of the European patent, 
the extent of the protection conferred by the 
European patent application shall be determined by 
the claims contained in the application as published. 
However, the European patent as granted or as 
amended in opposition, limitation or revocation 
                                                
 
88 Id. ¶ 39. 
89  520 U.S. 17, 28-29 (1997) 
90 Kirin-Amgen [2004] UKHL 46, ¶ 39. 
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proceedings shall determine retroactively the 
protection conferred by the European patent 
application, in so far as such protection is not 
thereby extended. (Emphasis added).91 
If Article 69 does not permit one to travel outside the 
language of the claims it is difficult to see how the use of the word 
“equivalent” in the Protocol, an inferior explanatory instrument, 
might permit one to do so. Perhaps the term “equivalent” only 
means that one must consider the possibility of variants, when one 
construes a term used in the claim in accordance with the 
descriptions and drawings. And this precisely is what Lord 
Hoffman stated in Amgen: 
Although article 69 prevents equivalence from 
extending protection outside the claims, there is no 
reason why it cannot be an important part of the 
background of facts known to the skilled man which 
would affect what he understood the claims to 
mean. That is no more than common sense. It is also 
expressly provided by the new article 2 added to the 
Protocol by the Munich Act revising the EPC, dated 
29 November 2000 (but which has not yet come 
into force).92 
Assuming a court takes an alternative interpretation and 
permits variants outside the scope of the claims (category 3 
discussed above) in a manner closely resembling the US doctrine 
of equivalents, this might lead to some inconsistency in relation to 
the law governing amendments to claims. Both the EPC93 and 
English law94 (which is meant to conform to the EPC) do not 
permit any amendments that extend the scope of the claims. If a 
claim cannot be amended during the normal course (either during 
prosecution after the date of publication or during infringement 
proceedings) in a manner that extends its scope, it would be rather 
incongruous to permit a court, during infringement proceedings, to 
enjoin an equivalent that falls outside the scope of the claim.  
Apart from the above, as Lord Hoffman rightly notes in 
Amgen v. TKT, any expansion in patent scope beyond the terms of 
                                                
 
91  EPC, supra note 39, art. 69(2), 1065 U.N.T.S. at 275, available at 
http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/html/epc/2000/e/ar69.html. 
92 Kirin-Amgen [2004] UKHL 46. 
93
See EPC, supra note 39, art. 123, 1065 U.N.T.S. at 275, available at 
http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/html/epc/2000/e/ar123.html. 
94 See Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, §§ 27 ("general power to amend specification 
after grant") and 75 ("amendment of patent in infringement or revocation 
proceedings") (1977) (Eng.). 
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the claim would unreasonably expose the patent to claims of 
invalidity on grounds of anticipation or insufficiency.95 
 
E.  Conclusion 
On its face, the purposive construction theory appears to be 
blessed with an elegance and simplicity that other theories 
governing immaterial variants or equivalents lack. However, as 
noted earlier, its key limitation lies in the fact that it cannot protect 
an equivalent or variant that lies beyond the language of the 
claims. As to whether this is good or bad policy is a moot issue. 
Some may argue, as Lord Hoffman did, that it provides more 
clarity and is less expensive for litigants than the American 
doctrine of equivalents. But does it provide fair protection to the 
patentee? So long as the variant in question is in some way 
supported by the specification, ought not the patentee to be 
permitted to prevent such unscrupulous copying? This concern is 
particularly acute when drafting difficulties make it apparent that 
the perfect claim is an unattainable ideal.  
This is a policy issue that might need to be tackled in a 
separate paper altogether. For the moment however, English law 
will only protect those variants that fall within the language of a 
claim. 
The EPC 2000 is unlikely to change much in this regard, at 
least in so far as the English courts are concerned. But if it is 
eventually read in a manner that permits an expansion of the scope 
of a patent to cover variants outside the language of a claim in the 
same way as the US doctrine of equivalents, the courts may need 
to work out a way to help tether this expansion in some meaningful 
way. Otherwise, English courts may find themselves exhibiting the 
same anxiety that once afflicted their U.S. counterparts, who in the 
Supreme Court decision Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis 
Chemical Co. lamented the fact that the doctrine of equivalents had 
“taken on a life of its own, unbounded by the patent claims.”96 
Only time will tell as to how the tricky issue of equivalents 
is likely to play out in the UK. In the meantime, the jury is out as 
to which country has the right answer in this regard. If the goal is 
to appropriately balance fair protection to the patentee with 
adequate notice of patent breadth to third parties, one might argue 
that English law does comes close to striking such an optimal 
balance. 
 
 
                                                
 
95 Kirin-Amgen [2004] UKHL 46, ¶ 47. 
96 520 U.S. 17, 28-29 (1997). 
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IV.  GERMANY* 
A.  Introduction 
The scope of patent protection in Europe is determined in 
large party by Art. 69 of the European Patent Convention (EPC) 
for all contracting states.97 Unfortunately, this Article leaves broad 
room for interpretation and is not understood in the same way all 
across Europe. For this reason, instead of a “final” European 
doctrine, this paper only presents the German view on this topic.98 
 
B.  Basic Principles of Claim Construction in German 
Law 
The statutory provisions governing the interpretation of 
patent claims and the determination of patent scope in German law 
are laconic. As discussed above, Art. 69(1) EPC only defines the 
scope of protection conferred by a European patent as being 
determined by the terms of the claims, and allows the description 
and drawings to be used to interpret these claims. This basic law is 
supplemented by the Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 as 
discussed above.99 The Munich Revision Act of November 29th 
2000 uses the text of the old Protocol to create Article 1 of the new 
Protocol and adds a new Article 2.  
Since the Protocol on the Interpretation is part of the 
EPC,100 “equivalents” is becoming a statutory legal term for the 
first time. But what are equivalents to elements specified in the 
claims? This question is not addressed and is therefore left to be 
answered by the courts. We have seen the English approach above 
and will now set out how the Bundesgerichtshof101 has defined a 
position which according to its assessment combines a fair 
protection for the patent proprietor with a reasonable degree of 
certainty for third parties. 
                                                
 
* Peter Meier-Beck Dr. iur., Judge at the Bundesgerichtshof, Karlsruhe, 
Germany, Honorarprofessor at the Heinrich-Heine-Universität, Düsseldorf, 
Germany; Max v. Rospatt, Attorney at Law and Partner at rospatt osten pross, 
Düsseldorf, Germany.   
97  All member states of the European Union, as well as a few more European 
states, particularly Switzerland. 
98 Section 14 of the German Patent Law (PatG) corresponds almost literally to 
Article 69(1) EPC. 
99 Protocol, supra note 81. 
100 EPC, art. 164(1), available at http://www.epo.org/ 
patents/law/legal-texts/html/epc/2000/e/ar164.html. 
101 The Bundesgerichtshof is the Supreme Court for civil and penal matters in 
Germany. The author Peter Meier-Beck is a member of its 10th Senate which is 
the patent law division. 
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The basis for determining the scope of protection is the 
interpretation of the patent claim.102 Before answering the question 
of whether a patent merits a scope of protection beyond its 
wording, there is the question of how this wording of the patent 
claim is to be understood. For this understanding, three basic 
principles are important: 
1. The understanding of a person skilled in the 
art addressed by the patent is decisive. The terms 
used in the patent claim are to be interpreted in view 
of the understanding of a person skilled in the art, 
that is, a person who is active in the technical field 
of the invention.103 
2. The person skilled in the art will consider 
the technical function of the individual feature of 
the patent claim as particularly important, when 
trying to understand the terms used in the patent 
claim. 104  This is called “function-aimed 
interpretation” or “purposive construction.”105 But 
when taking this approach, one has to keep in mind 
that the understanding of a physically defined 
feature must not be reduced to its function. 
Otherwise, there is the danger that the difference 
between determining the meaning of the wording of 
the patent claim and the determination of the scope 
of protection becomes unclear by incorporating 
equivalents identical in function into the meaning of 
the wording of the claim.106 
3. The person skilled in the art will not look at 
isolated terms and features of the patent claim, but 
will rather try to understand their meaning in the 
                                                
 
102  EPC, art. 69(1), available at http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-
texts/html/epc/2000/e/ar69.html. 
103 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Mar. 2, 1999, Case No. 
X ZR 85/96, as translated in 30 Intellectual Review of Industrial Property and 
Copyright Law [IIC] 932, 939 (Spannschraube [Tension screw]). 
104 Id. at 939; BGH Nov. 7, 2000, Case No. X ZR 145/98, as translated in 33 IIC 
647, 649 (Brieflocher [Letter Punch]). 
105  Uwe Scharen, BENKARD, EUROPÄISCHES PATENTÜBEREINKOMMEN 
[EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION] 704 (2002); Peter Meier-Beck, The Latest 
Issues in German Patent Infringement Proceedings, 2000 Gewerblicher 
Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht [GRUR] 355, translated in 32 IIC 505, 511-14 
(2001). 
106 Friedrich-Wilhelm Engel, The “Wortsinn” of Patent Claims in German Case 
Law on Patent Infringement Disputes, 34 IIC 233 (242) (2003); Peter Meier-
Beck, Aktuelle Fragen der Schutzbereichsbestimmung im deutschen und 
europäischen Patentrecht [Current Issues of Identifying the Scope of Protection 
in German and European Patent Law], 2003 GRUR 905. 
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context of the entire claim and the set of claims, 
whereby using the description including cited prior 
art and his common general knowledge again to 
understand the claim as a whole.107 This is generally 
referred to as “context-aimed interpretation.”108 The 
meaning of a term determined in such a way does 
not necessarily have to correspond with the general 
meaning of this term in that field of art. Rather, as 
the Bundesgerichtshof puts it: “patent specifications 
virtually represent their own lexicon.”109 
Interpreting the patent claim according to these basic 
principles is referred to generally in case law as “determination of 
the meaning of the wording” (Wortsinn) or “determination of the 
technical meaning” of the patent claim.110 The interpretation is 
solely based on the claim, the claim set, the description, the cited 
prior art, and the general common knowledge. The file wrapper is 
therefore not considered.111 
This level of examination is of profound importance for 
patent infringement proceedings: if the contested embodiment 
incorporates every single feature of the claim, properly construed, 
then the patent is infringed.112 In this case, much like the position 
in the United Kingdom discussed above, there is no need to think 
about equivalents. 
 
C.  Protection of “Equivalents” Under German Law 
How is the infringement suit to be decided, if the contested 
embodiment does not correspond to the wording of the patent 
claim? In Germany and other countries of continental Europe, 
there is and has been a near consensus, that, in this case, patent 
infringement is not necessarily excluded, and the scope of 
protection extends beyond the mere wordings of the claim. One of 
the central questions in patent law is therefore how this scope of 
protection is to be determined. Where is the border to be drawn 
between that area, that is to be reserved for the patentee for the 
protection of his or her inventive achievement, and the neighboring 
area, which every competitor can use to compete with the 
patentee? This issue is closely connected with a second question: 
                                                
 
107 Tension Screw, 30 IIC 932. 
108 Meier-Beck, supra note 76, at 511-14. 
109 Tension Screw, 30 IIC at 939. 
110 BGH June 14, 1988, Case No. X ZR 5/87, as translated in 22 IIC 249, 253 
(Ionenanalyse [Ion Analysis]). 
111 BGH Mar. 12, 2002, Case No. X ZR 43/01, as translated in 34 IIC 302 
(Kunststoffrohrteil [Plastic Pipe]). 
112 Ion Analysis, 22 IIC at 253. 
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how can this borderline be drawn so that it is clearly delineated—
that is how can the scope of patent protection be defined, so that 
legal certainty is ensured? Those are exactly the two goals 
enshrined in the Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 of the 
EPC:113 appropriate protection for the patentee on the one hand, 
and sufficient legal certainty for third parties on the other. As 
discussed above, the United Kingdom has its own doctrine that, in 
the view of its courts, correctly applies the rules provided by the 
EPC. Similarly, the Bundesgerichtshof has developed a test for 
applying these laws, but the result is not identical to that of the 
British courts. 
In terms of competition law, defining the border of the 
scope of protection means to distinguish two areas: the “open” area 
in which the complete or partial imitation of products or product 
concepts is a legitimate means of competition, and the “closed” 
area in which competitors are forced to use substitutes rather than 
copies.114 A focus on this competition-controlling function helps 
one appreciate the importance of laying down a clearly discernable 
borderline. Unfortunately, optimal discernability of such a 
borderline does not easily correspond to the optimal economic 
balance between patent protection and freedom of competition. If 
the criterion of predictability is treated as absolute, it is very hard 
to grant reasonable scope to the patent and to draw this line 
appropriately. The scope of protection would be reduced to the 
literal wording of the patent claim, thereby permitting easy 
circumvention by a third party. When drafting a patent claim, the 
drafters’ imagination is usually not sufficient to think about all 
possible cases, in which a third person may circumvent the literal 
wording of a feature and still appropriate the core aspects of the 
invention. 
Insofar as Article 2 of the Protocol on the Interpretation of 
Article 69 states that the scope of protection conferred by a patent 
is to be extended to variants or ‘equivalents’ it only puts in 
different words what can now already be derived from Article 
69(1) of the EPC. However, neither the EPC nor the Protocol set 
out how the scope of protection is to be determined. Article 69(1) 
of the EPC only dicates that the patent claims are the main 
reference point for defining scope. According to the principles 
developed by the Bundesgerichtshof, the patent claims form not 
only the starting point, but also the decisive basis for determining 
                                                
 
113 Protocol, supra note 81. 
114 BGH July 13, 2004, Case No. KZR 40/02, as translated in 36 IIC 741 
(Standard-Spundfass [Standard Tight-Head Drum]). 
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the extent of protection: protection must align with the patent 
claims.115 
The fact that incorporating equivalents into the scope of 
protection would detract from legal certainty does not mean that 
the goal of an easily recognizable borderline should be abandoned 
altogether. Article 1 of the Protocol demands a position “which 
combines a fair protection with a reasonable degree of legal 
certainty for third parties.”116 Therefore, it is the task of the courts 
to find criteria for the determination of the scope of protection 
which reconcile both demands. 
The most pragmatic instrument of choice here is the 
cognitive faculties of a person skilled in the art, who is, on the 
basis of his knowledge and skill in the art, analyzing the patent 
claim and using the description and the drawings to interpret the 
claim.117 The scope of the patent is determined by this person’s 
conclusions. It extends to any variant that is made obvious by the 
claim to the person skilled in the art.118 On the one hand, this has 
the effect that the scope of the patent is proportionate to all subject 
matter that can be done or carried out by the person skilled in the 
art, on the basis of the protected inventive achievement, without 
being inventive himself (demand for fair protection). On the other 
hand, this extent of protection is (almost) becoming predictable by 
focusing on subject-matter, which is recognized by a person skilled 
in the art, as being part of the protection conferred by the patent 
(demand for legal certainty). 
This needs to be explained in more detail. But before doing 
that, one “obvious” objection has to be addressed: if a variant 
included in the scope of patent protection is obvious to a person 
skilled in the art, then why can the applicant not be expected to 
explicitly incorporate it into the patent claim? Should he not realize 
and include what is obvious?119 This question is understandable, 
but it fails to recognize that the average person skilled in the art is 
as artificial as the situation, in which he is brought into by us, 
                                                
 
115 See BGH Nov. 29, 1988, Case No. X ZR 63/87, 104 Entscheidungen des 
Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 84, as reprinted in 1989 GRUR 
205 (Schwermetalloxidationskatalysator [Heavy Metal Oxidation Catalytic 
Converter]). 
116 Protocol, supra note 81, art. 1. 
117 Id. (mentioning explicitly the “consideration of the description and drawings 
by a person skilled in the art” (emphasis added)). 
118 Ion Analysis, 22 IIC 249. 
119 Judge Rader assumes an obligation of the patentee “to draft claims that 
capture all reasonably foreseeable ways to practice the invention” in his 
concurring opinion in Johnson & Johnston Associates Inc. v. R.E. Service Co., 
285 F.3d 1046, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Rader, J., concurring). 
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when we need his advice.120 When revoking or invalidating a 
patent, because the person skilled in the art would have combined 
two prior art documents, we are generally not disturbed by the fact 
that no existing person skilled in the art has ever really done this—
except the inventor him or herself.121 And we are not to be 
disturbed by this, because otherwise, everything new would have 
to be regarded as involving an inventive step. It is no different as 
far as the obvious variants are concerned, which would have been 
found by the person skilled in the art, even if the applicant had not 
thought of them in any way. 
In short, the scope of the patent does extend to those 
variants which are made obvious to a person skilled in the art by 
the patent claim. The scope of the doctrine of equivalents under 
German law is now conveniently split up into four questions, as 
discussed below. 
 
D.  The Four Questions 
Schneidmesser I (Cutting Blade I), a fundamental German 
case on the doctrine of equivalents, divided the examination of the 
scope of protection into a series of questions,122 thereby referring 
back to the English model of purposive construction under 
Catnic
123 and later elucidated by Justice (as he then was) Leonard 
Hoffmann in what came to be commonly called the Improver 
questions.124  
1. The first question is: Does the modified embodiment 
solve the problem underlying the invention by means which have 
objectively the same technical effect?
125
 
This question resembles the first Improver question,126 but 
it is not identical to it. Nor does it ask about how the invention 
“works” or the function-way-result test; rather, it only asks about 
                                                
 
120 BGH Sept. 7, 2004, Case No. X ZR 255/01, as translated in 36 IIC 971, 975 
(Bodenseitige Vereinzelungseinrichtung [Bottom Separating Mechanism]). 
121 According to the could-would test, see, e.g., In re Rider, Case No. T2/83, 
1984 Official Journal of the European Patent Office [OJ. EPO] 265, ¶ 7 (EPO 
Boards of Appeal, Mar. 15, 1984), available at http://legal.european-patent-
office.org/dg3/biblio/t830002ep1.htm, a novel teaching is considered not 
inventive if the man skilled in the art could and would have carried it out. 
122 BGH Mar. 12, 2002, Case No. X ZR 168/00, as translated in 33 IIC 873 
(Schneidmesser I [Cutting Blade I]). 
123 Catnic Components Ltd. v. Mill & Smith Ltd., [1982] R.P.C. 163 (H.L.) 
(U.K.). 
124 See Improver Corp. v. Remington Consumer Products Ltd., [1990] R.P.C. 69, 
[1990] F.S.R. 181 (U.K.).  
125 Cutting Blade I, 33 IIC at 875 (whether “it solves the problem underlying the 
invention with modified but objectively equivalent means”). 
126 “Does the variant have a material effect upon the way the invention works?” 
Improver, 1990 F.S.R. at 182. 
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the result of this effort. The identical result has to be achieved at 
least to a practically relevant degree.127 A merely similar effect is 
not sufficient. 
There is the obvious objection that this question could be 
subjected to concerns raised by Lord Justice Robin Jacob with 
regard to the first Improver-question, in that the requirement by 
Article 69 of the EPC that the interpretation be in the context of the 
patent claim is not met. 128  But this is not the case. As the 
Bundesgerichtshof has pointed out, a claim-oriented approach is 
necessary to decide whether the modified means have the same 
effect.129 Only such variants can be said to have the same technical 
effect that produce results a person skilled in the art understands to 
be so produced from the claims by every single feature and by the 
mutual connection of all features of the claim.130 Determining the 
technical effect means determining those effects that the person 
skilled in the art understands to be the result of the technical 
teaching of the claim. For this reason, the first question and the 
‘technical matter’ that it seeks to assess are not divorced from the 
patent claim. The objective technical correspondence is only 
relevant in that it shows up as a correspondence of all effects a 
person skilled in the art understands to be the effects of the 
inventive technical teaching.131 
If the answer to the first question is “no”, the contested 
embodiment is outside the scope of the patent. If yes, we move on 
to the second question: 
2. Was the person skilled in the art enabled by his 
expertise on the priority date to find the modified means as having 
the same effect?
132 
This question is all about excluding those cases in which an 
inventive step was necessary to find the modified means as having 
the same effect.133 
If that is the case, i.e. if the means having the same effect 
were not obvious to the person skilled in the art, they are outside 
the scope of the patent.134 Because what the person skilled in the 
                                                
 
127 BGH June 28, 2000, Case No. X ZR 128/98, as translated in 33 IIC 349, 351 
(Bratgeschirr [Roasting Pots]). 
128 Lord Justice Jacob, Last Word: A Letter from Justice Jacob, 2003 Patent 
World 155.  
129 See Roasting Pots, 33 IIC at 350; Cutting Blade I, 33 IIC at 874-75. 
130 Roasting Pots, 33 IIC at 351. 
131 See id.  
132 See Cutting Blade I, 33 IIC at 875 (“[T]he person skilled in the art is able to 
use his specialist knowledge to identify the modified means as having the same 
effect.”). 
133 BGH Oct. 24, 1986, Case No. X ZR 45/85, as translated in 19 IIC 243, 243-
44 (Befestigungsvorrichtung [Fixing Device]). 
134 Id. 
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art is not able to find and to do based on the patent and helped by 
his or her knowledge in the art, is not to be granted to the 
patentee.135 Else, the fundamental bargain underlying most patent 
regimes is violated"i.e. that a patent is an exclusive right granted 
for a limited period in exchange for certain technical teaching 
made available by the patentee to the public, by publication of the 
patent.  
If either questions one or two are answered in the negative, 
there is no infringement by equivalents. However, if both are 
answered in the affirmative, we still have to ask a third question 
before finding for infringement.136 The format for this question is 
given by the Bundesgerichtshof in the decision “Schneidmesser I”, 
as explained below.  
3. While answering question two, are the 
considerations that the person skilled in the art applies drawn from 
the technical teaching of the patent claim (so that the person 
skilled in the art took the modified embodiment into account as 
being an equivalent solution)?
137
 
Why is this third question necessary? Has everything 
necessary not been examined already, if the first two questions can 
be answered with a “yes”? That is not the case, for the following 
reasons: The first “Schneidmesser”-question pertains only to an 
objectively identical “technical effect,” i.e., a correspondence in 
the result that the invention aims at.138 But this correspondence and 
the fact that the person skilled in the art was able to recognize it 
without being inventive are not sufficient to bring the modified 
embodiment within the scope of protection. If this was only about 
including all variants that a person skilled in the art would have 
been able to do with the teaching of the patent, then the second 
question alone would be sufficient. But there is more at stake here: 
This is not only about what the person skilled in the art would have 
been able to do on the priority date knowing the patent, but about 
what he would have been able to do and would have done on the 
basis of the patent (of the patent claim).139 Again, one has to keep 
in mind that the exclusive patent right correlates to the invention’s 
technical teaching made available by virtue of the patent being 
published. That is why the third question is about whether the 
considerations, which the person skilled in the art has to make, are 
                                                
 
135 BGH May 15, 1975, Case No. X ZR 35/72, as reprinted in 1976 GRUR 88 
(89/90) (Ski-Absatzbefestigung [Ski Heel Attachment]) (discussing the 
requirement that patents have clear, technically simple claims which can be 
deciphered by an expert). 
136 See Cutting Blade I, 33 IIC at 875. 
137 See id. at 875. 
138 See Roasting Pots, 33 IIC at 350. 
139 See Cutting Blade I, 33 IIC at 876. 
THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS IN VARIOUS PATENT REGIMES—DOES 
ANYBODY HAVE IT RIGHT? 
 294 
sufficiently close to the technical meaning of the patent claim, i.e., 
whether they are drawn from the patent claim’s teaching to the 
person skilled in the art. The technical teaching of the patent claim 
has to be the decisive basis for the consideration of the person 
skilled in the art, so that he recognizes the variant as an equivalent 
alternative to an embodiment which carries out the wording (in 
context) of the patent claim.140  
This perspective offered by the third question is reflected, 
in some part, in the first English Improver question, when asking 
about the way the invention works.141 But it is not the same. It is 
rather a question of whether the essential considerations needed by 
a person skilled in the art to find the variant are sufficiently close 
to the patent claim to show an equivalent alternative.142 In the end, 
both questions depend on judicial interpretation. However, it 
appears that posing these three questions has certain advantages: 
on the one hand, the correspondence in the technical effect of the 
invention is not subjected to relativization anymore. On the other 
hand, the standard for deciding whether a modified means of 
attaining the desired technical effect are within the scope of 
protection relies specifically on ‘matter’ that the person skilled in 
the art is able to get out of the patent claim. And according to the 
law, it is the patent claim which determines the scope of the 
patent.143 
4. Is the modified embodiment anticipated or made 
obvious by the state of the art?
144 
This question, which is known as the Formstein objection 
in German case law, 145  is necessary to prevent a scope of 
protection (after the previous three questions have been answered 
in the affirmative) that is too broad in comparison to the state of 
the art, since it encompasses an embodiment, which—however 
rarely it may be the case—lacks novelty or at least was obvious to 
a person skilled in the art at the time of patenting.146 It is only the 
direct subject matter of the patent application that is examined for 
patentability during the grant procedure.147 The Patent Office does 
                                                
 
140 See Heavy Metal Oxidation Catalytic Converter, 1989 GRUR (208). 
141 Improver Corp. v. Remington Consumer Products Ltd., [1990] R.P.C. 69, 
[1990] F.S.R. 181 (U.K.). 
142 See Cutting Blade I, 33 IIC at 875. 
143  See EPC, art. 69(1), available at http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-
texts/html/epc/ 
2000/e/ar69.html. 
144 See Cutting Blade I, 33 IIC at 875. 
145 See BGH Apr. 29, 1986, Case No. X ZR 28/85, as translated in 18 IIC 795 
(Formstein [Molded Curbstone]) (allowing objection for the first time).  
146 Id.  at 800.  
147 See BGH Nov. 7, 2000, Case No. X ZR 145/98, as translated in 33 IIC 647, 
648 (Brieflocher [Letter Punch]). 
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not determine what, having regard to the state of the art, the 
adequate scope of protection for the subject matter ought to be.148 
Consequently, such a determination has to be made at the stage of 
infringement proceedings. 
It is pertinent to note that unlike U.S. law, file history 
estoppel has no role for the determination of the scope of the 
patent. The main reason for this is given in the Kunststoffrohrteil 
decision, which states that Article 69 of the EPC does not mention 
the file history as a means of interpretation.149 However, this may 
not be the only reason. As mentioned in Kunststoffrohrteil itself, 
there is no practical need to consider events that took place during 
the grant procedure. 150  Either an equivalent solution is not 
patentable in view of the state of the art— in which case the 
Formstein objection prevents the patentee from being given 
protection for it.151 Or, during the grant procedure, the patentee has 
assumed erroneously, or has created the impression that an 
equivalent solution would not be patentable. In that case, this is 
irrelevant, because the grant procedure is only for the purpose of 
determining the subject matter of the patent. The scope of the 
patent, on the contrary, is to be determined during infringement 
proceedings. Therefore, any (faulty) views harbored by the 
patentee or mentioned by him during the grant procedure are 
without meaning.152 
 
E.  Conclusion 
The German approach to the question of equivalents can be 
summarized as follows: 
The main basis for the determination of the scope of patent 
protection is the patent claim and an understanding by a person 
skilled in the art of the technical teaching embodied in such a 
claim. For this purpose, a patent claim has to be interpreted in 
conjunction with both the description of the invention and the 
drawings. In doing so, the basic principles of function-aimed 
interpretation of the terms used in the patent claim, as well as a 
context-based interpretation, are to be followed. A contested 
embodiment which falls within the meaning of the claim so 
construed infringes the patent literally. 
A patent can also be infringed if the contested embodiment 
does not fall within the “literal” scope of the patent claim. This 
                                                
 
148 Id. at 648. 
149 See BGH Mar. 12, 2002, Case No. X ZR 43/01, as translated in 34 IIC 302, 
303 (Kunststoffrohrteil [Plastic Pipe]). 
150 Id. at 307. 
151 See Molded Curbstone, 18 IIC 795. 
152 See Plastic Pipe, 34 IIC at 307. 
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extension in the scope of the patent is to bring about an adequate 
level of protection of the inventive achievement in a way that also 
ensures the highest possible level of legal certainty. This optimal 
balance is achieved by protecting only those variants that the 
patent claim (and not just the prior art) has made obvious to a 
person skilled in the art, on the priority date. That is the case, if the 
following questions 1 to 3 are answered in the affirmative and, in 
addition, question 4 is answered in the negative: 
1.  Does the modified embodiment solve the problem 
underlying the invention by means which have objectively the same 
technical effect? 
2.  Was the person skilled in the art enabled by her 
specialist knowledge on the priority date to find that the modified 
means would have the same effect? 
3.  While answering question 2, are the considerations 
that the person skilled in the art applies drawn from the technical 
teaching of the patent claim (so that the person skilled in the art 
took the modified embodiment into account as being an equivalent 
solution)? 
4.  Is the modified embodiment anticipated or made 
obvious by the state of the art? 
 
V.   JAPAN* 
A.  Introduction 
Our analysis of the doctrine of equivalents in Japan has 
been prepared by an insider, former Tokyo High Court Judge 
Yukio Nagasawa. In his account he references another leading IP 
jurist, Ryoichi Mimura, now a judge on the Tokyo IP High Court. 
His role in the creation of the doctrine of equivalents is an 
important part of the story for it was only in 1998 that the doctrine 
of equivalents came to be accepted under Japanese law via the 
famous Supreme Court decision, THK Co. v. Tsubakimoto Seiko 
Co. (commonly referred to as the Ball Spline decision).153 Prior to 
this, although major academic theories supported this doctrine, 
judicial decisions did not.154 
B.  Before Ball Spline: Identity as a Technological Idea 
Despite the fact that the Japanese Patent Act did not have 
any provision relating to a doctrine of equivalents, major academic 
theories were in favor of such a doctrine. They were of the view 
                                                
 
153 Tsubakimoto Seiko v. THK K.K. (Ball Spline), 52 MINSH! 113 (Sup. Ct., 
Feb. 2, 1998). 
154 See Judge Ryoichi Mimura, Hanrei Kaisetsu [Court Precedent Commentary], 
10 SAIK" SAIBANSHO HANJI KAISETSU MINJI HEN [COMMENTS TO THE SUPREME 
COURT PRECEDENTS] 112, 132 (1998) [hereinafter Hanrei Kaisetsu]. 
11 Yale J.L. & Tech. 261              2008-2009 
 297 
that such a doctrine was part of equity and express statutory 
provisions were not necessary to validate such a doctrine.155 
Such theories proposed the following requirements for 
invoking a doctrine of equivalents: 
(i) Interchangeability: The equivalent element in the 
accused device achieves the same function and result as the 
corresponding element of the patented invention.156 
(ii) Ease of interchangeability: Such interchangeability 
as mentioned above is easily conceived of by a person of ordinary 
skill in the art.157 
Some scholars argued that the first requirement, 
interchangeability, should be taken to be fulfilled only when the 
underlying technological idea of the allegedly infringing product is 
the same as the patented invention"a requirement conveniently 
labeled as “identity as a technological idea.”158 They argued that 
the scope of a patented invention should not be extended to cover a 
different technological idea, even if the same function and the 
same result could be achieved.159 
Although there were academic theories to support a 
doctrine of equivalents, many judges were reluctant to read a 
doctrine of equivalents into Japanese patent law. Some judges 
ventured to do so, however, despite the absence of a Supreme 
Court precedent.160 
These judges decided that “identity as a technological idea” 
should be a part of the requirements for invoking the doctrine"a 
different technological idea would mean that the allegedly 
infringing invention was different from the patented one.161 One of 
their reasons for doing so could be that these courts might have 
                                                
 
155 See id. at 125. 
156 Id. at 126. 
157 Id. at 127. 
158 Id. at 140. 
159 See Takashi Honma, Saikousai Hanketu (mugen shudou you boru supurain 
jikuuke jiken) kara mita 21seiki ni okeru wagakuni no tokkyokenn no kennri 
kaishaku no doukou [Movement of Claim Interpretation of Japanese Patent 
Right in the 21st Century from the Viewpoint of the Supreme Court Precedent 
(Ball Spline Decision)], 48 CHIZAI KANRI [INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
MANAGEMENT] 1795, 1796 (1998). Mr. Takashi Honma, a Japanese attorney, 
has had significant experience with patent matters. 
160 See Hanrei Kaisetu, supra note 154, at 132. 
161 See Etsuji Kotani, Boru supurain saikousai hanketsu ga shimeshita kintouron 
tekiyou youken no (1) to (2) no igi to kongo no kadai ni tuite [The Meaning of 
Requirements (1) and (2) of the Doctrine of Equivalents Decided by the 
Supreme Court Decision in the Ball Spline Case and Future Issues], in TOKKYO 
SAIBAN NI OKERU KINTOURON [THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS IN PATENT 
LITIGATION] 15, 16 (Murabayashi et al. eds., 2003). Mr. Kotani has substantial 
experience as a Japanese patent attorney. 
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thought that stricter requirements built into such a doctrine would 
make for easier acceptability of their decisions by the Supreme 
Court. It is quite possible that these lower court judgments might 
have had some influence on the Supreme Court when it decided 
the Ball Spline case. 
 
C.  The Ball Spline Decision: The Essential/Inessential 
Distinction 
Patent litigation in Japan has changed dramatically since 
the Ball Spline decision. Most patentees now invoke this doctrine 
in patent litigation based on the five requirements laid down by 
Ball Spline. The opinion is relatively brief and its essence is found 
in the following two paragraphs. The reader should bear in mind 
that by far the most important requirement of the five listed below 
is requirement one162: 
In determining whether an accused product 
or method falls within the technical scope of a 
patented invention, the technical scope of the 
invention must be determined with respect to the 
claim (see Patent Law Section 70 (1). If there are 
elements that differ between the claim and the 
accused product, the accused product and the like 
cannot be said to fall within the technical scope of 
the patented invention. On the other hand, even if 
there are elements in the claim that differ from the 
corresponding product and the like, the 
corresponding product and the like may be 
equivalent and may appropriately be said to fall 
within the technical scope of the patented invention 
if the following conditions are satisfied: (1) the 
differing elements are not the essential elements in 
the patented invention; (2) even if the differing 
elements are interchanged by elements of the 
accused product and the like, the object of the 
patented invention can be achieved and the same 
effects can be obtained; (3) by interchanging as 
above, a person of ordinary skill in the art to which 
the invention pertains (hereinafter referred to as an 
artisan) could have easily arrived at the accused 
                                                
 
162 This requirement underlies most of the rejections of cases in which the 
doctrine of equivalents has been invoked since the Ball Spline decision.  See 
DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS IN PATENT LITIGATION, supra note 161, app. at 708-
13 [hereinafter Ball Spline Tables] (Boru supurain saikousai hanketsu go no 
kintouron ga ronjirareta hanketu ichiran [Tables of the judgments decided about 
the doctrine of equivalents after the Ball Spline decision]). 
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product and the like at the time of manufacture; (4) 
the accused product and the like are not the same as 
the known art at the time of application for patent or 
could not have been easily conceived by an artisan 
at the time of application for patent; and (5) there is 
not any special circumstances such that the accused 
product and the like are intentionally excluded from 
the scope of the claim during patent prosecution). 
 
1.   Hanrei Kaisetsu by Judge Ryoichi Mimura 
Judge Mimura, the main Supreme Court Researcher for the 
Ball Spline decision, published his comments later as Hanrei 
Kaisetsu.163  Although the responsibility of the Supreme Court 
researcher in Japan is similar to law clerks of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, Japanese researchers’ reports are more influential, because 
Japanese Supreme Court researchers are appointed from among 
judges who have more than ten years’ experience as a judge. It is 
reasonable to assume that Judge Mimura’s advice to the Supreme 
Court in the Ball Spline case corresponds with his views in Hanrei 
Kaisetsu. 
A key aspect of Judge Mimura’s argument in Hanrei 
Kaisetsu is that the positive requirements under the Ball Spline 
decision can be co-related with the requirements spelt out by 
scholars who were in favor of the doctrine of equivalents (hereafter 
referred to as positive theory).164 
The first positive requirement, “Essential Part,” is the same 
as “identity as a technological idea” of the positive doctrine. The 
second requirement, “Interchangeability,” and the third, “Ease of 
interchangeability,” are the same as the corresponding 
requirements of the positive doctrine prior to the Ball Spline 
decision.165 
Judge Mimura goes on to then stress that the doctrine of 
equivalents is not applied to the essential part of the invention even 
in the United States or Germany. 166  However, his 
recommendations in Hanrei Kaisetsu have no binding power and 
we find no cases supporting his view that there is an 
essential/nonessential distinction in the law of the United States or 
that there ever was such a distinction in the past except insofar as it 
                                                
 
163 See Hanrei Kaisetsu, supra note 154, at 101. 
164 Id. at 140. 
165 Id. at 140 n.4. 
166 Id. at 140 n.4. Judge Mimura states that the doctrine of equivalents cannot be 
applied to the essential part of the invention even in the United States and 
Germany, “as I mention below”. However, he does not go on to discuss this 
issue “below” or in any of the following sections of his report. 
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would be understood that an essential component can have no 
equivalent in the context of the claimed invention.167 Arguably this 
may be said as well for Germany. However, ironically the 
essential/nonessential distinction was a part of U.K. law for many 
years. The last judicial statement discussing it is found in the 
opinion of Lord Justice Buckley in Catnic Components Ltd. v. Hill 
& Smith Ltd., where he said: 
If the alleged infringement of the claim has all the 
features of the claim it must infringe the claim, even 
if it also incorporates other features. If it lacks one 
of the features of the claim, it may or may not 
infringe the claim. If the feature which is lacking is 
an essential feature of the claim, there will be no 
infringement; but, . . . . if it has all the essential 
features of the claim, it will infringe the claim 
notwithstanding the omission or substitution of an 
unessential feature. . . . So it becomes necessary to 
consider what distinguishes a feature of a claim 
which is essential from one which is not essential. . 
. . Will it be essential to the validity of the claim . . . 
or will it suffice that the patentee has elected to 
limit his claim by the inclusion in it of the feature in 
question, thus disclaiming a monopoly in anything 
not incorporating that particular feature?168 
Indeed, it probably was the difficulty of determining 
whether an element was essential or not that led the House of 
Lords in the appeal from the decision of Lord Justice Buckley and 
his fellow judges on the Court of Appeal to abandon this approach 
to patent infringement altogether and to substitute therefore what it 
called “purposive construction.”169 
                                                
 
167 Judge Shitara, a judge of the Tokyo High Court, argues that the three positive 
requirements of the Ball Spline decision are basically the same as the ‘function-
way-result’ requirements of the U.S. test.  Specifically, he argues that the U.S. 
requirements of the ‘way’ prong correspond to the ‘Essential Part’ prong in 
Japan (first requirement).  See Judge Ryuichi Shitara, FESTO saikousai hanketu 
zengo no beikoku no kintouron narabini beikoku, eikoku, doitsu oyobi wagakuni 
no kintouron no kokusaiteki hikaku [The American Doctrine of Equivalents 
Before and After the FESTO Supreme Court Decision and the International 
Comparative Study of the Doctrine of Equivalent in the US, UK, Germany, and 
Japan], in CHITEKI ZAISANKEN, SONO KEISEI TO HOGO [INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHT, ITS CREATION AND PROTECTION] 141, 155 (Toshiaki Nagai, 
Kuniharu Yasue & Sachikuni Iwasaki eds., 2002).  Judge Shitara, however, does 
not substantiate this claim well enough. 
168 Catnic Components Ltd. v. Hill & Smith Ltd., [1979] F.S.R. 619, 629-30 
(C.A.) (U.K.). 
169 Catnic Components Ltd. v. Hill & Smith Ltd., [1982] R.P.C. 183, 243 (H.L.) 
(U.K.). 
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2.  Defining “Essential Part” 
Returning now to Japan, prior to finding an apt definition 
for the term “essential part,” one has to determine whether the 
essential part requirement is a necessary one at all—can we 
dispense with it? The Ball Spline decision, which is binding 
precedent, clearly states that the essential part requirement is 
necessary and until now there has not been a single judicial 
decision that has dispensed with the essential part requirement. It is 
extremely difficult to change precedent in Japan170 and there does 
not appear to be any move by the Parliament to amend the law. 
Therefore, the “essential part” requirement is here to stay and one 
is forced to attempt a definition for it.  
A number of authorities have tried to suggest possible 
definitions of “essential part.” Judge Nishida, a presiding judge of 
the Tokyo High Court, argues that the definition of “essential part” 
cannot be found in the Ball Spline decision and cannot even be 
extrapolated from the Ball Spline decision.171 He explains that 
there are two ways of interpreting the term “essential part”: 
(i) Literal Interpretation: As the heading 
suggests, one is to interpret “essential part” literally 
according to what one skilled in the art would 
consider as essential parts for the claimed invention 
based on the prior art and the specification.172 Thus, 
one has to decide what part of the claim is essential 
to the claimed invention.173 
(ii) Identity as a Technological Idea: The term 
“essential part” corresponds with the “identity as a 
technological idea” requirement propounded by the 
positive theories prior to the Ball Spline decision.174 
Under this theory, one need not decide what 
specific part of the invention is “essential.” 
Applying the identity as a technological idea 
requirement, one would consider the technological 
idea of the claimed invention and consider the 
                                                
 
170 To change a precedent, an en banc (Grand Bench) decision of the Supreme 
Court of Japan is necessary. 
171 See Judge Yoshiaki Nishida, Shingai sosho ni okeru kintou no houri [The 
doctrine of equivalents in infringement litigation], in CHITEKI ZAISAN SOSHO HO 
[INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 182, 186 (Toshiaki Makino & Toshiaki Iimura 
eds., 2002). 
172 Id. at 192. 
173 How does one decide “what part of the claim is essential” under Judge 
Nishida’s proposal?  This question is debatable and difficult for attorneys 
outside Japan, and maybe in Japan too, to fully understand and grasp. 
174 See Nishida, supra note 171, at 192. 
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features that result in the technological idea of the 
claimed invention.175 
The often cited decision to extrapolate the meaning of 
essential part is a decision from the Tokyo High Court.176 The key 
aspects of the judgment are extrapolated below: 
(i)  The “essential” part of the patented 
invention is the characteristic part, which is the core 
of the technological idea underlying the solution to 
the technological problem addressed by specific 
patented invention.177 
(ii)  When deciding whether a part of the 
allegedly infringing device corresponds to the 
“essential part” of the patented invention, one 
should not merely look narrowly at the claim, but 
should take a wider view of the characteristic 
principle underlying the means to solve the 
problem, when compared with the prior art, and 
then decide whether the principle of the means of 
the accused device conforms substantially to an 
identical principle underlying the patented 
invention.178 
The key problem with the judgment is that the definition 
suggested by the court is not a clear one and is difficult to 
understand. Notwithstanding this lack of clarity, a number of lower 
courts have tried to follow this definition.179 Moreover, as Mr. 
Jubin Matsumoto, a prominent litigator from Japan, argues, the 
court definition appears to have an inbuilt contradiction.180 The 
definition is composed of two different parts, as mentioned above. 
While the former part is akin to an “all elements rule,” the latter 
part involves considerations similar to “invention as a whole.”181 If 
so, these two rules contradict each other. 
                                                
 
175 Id. at 193. 
176 Shinwa Seisakusyo v. Fulta Electric Machinery, 1738 HANREI-JIHO 97 
(Tokyo High Court, Oct. 26, 2000). 
177 Id. at 98. 
178 Id. at 98. 
179 See Kotani, supra note 161, at 19-20; see also BESSATSU JURISUTO 152-63 
(Nobuhiro Nakayama, Hidetaka Aizawa & Tetsuya Oobuchi eds., 3d ed. 2004). 
180 See BESSATSU JURISUTO, supra note 179, at 159. Mr. Matsumoto commented 
on a judgment decided by the Osaka High Court on April 19, 2001. Eli Lilly 
Japan K.K. v. Farmacia Akucheboraagu, 2311 HANKO 2d 500 (Osaka High Ct., 
Apr. 19, 2001). The Osaka High Court’s decision on the ‘essential part’ 
requirement was similar to the Tokyo High Court’s decision in 2000 mentioned 
above. Mr. Matsumoto’s criticism of the Osaka High Court decision would 
apply to the Tokyo High Court decision. 
181 BESSATSU JURISUTO, supra note 179, at 159. 
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As mentioned above, Hanrei Kaisetsu argues that the 
“essential Part” requirement is the same as the “identity as a 
technological idea” concept propounded by the positive theories 
prior to the Ball Spline decision. If so, the former half of the Tokyo 
High Court judgment contradicts even Hanrei Kaisetsu, because 
the former half says that the essential part of the patented invention 
is the characteristic part, which is the “core” of the technological 
idea.182 This focus on the core appears to stand opposed to the way 
that one would identify the patented invention as a technological 
idea, as a whole. 
Given that in this imperfect world some definition must be 
found for “essential part” before there can be a proper function 
doctrine of equivalence in Japan, and thus far no clear definition 
has been put forth, the authors suggest that the decision should be 
based on the claim and the prior art. 
Illustratively, if the patented invention is composed of 
elements A and B, and the element A is part of prior art, it can be 
concluded that it is the addition of element B that makes the 
invention patentable. Therefore, element B should be taken to be 
the “essential part” of the invention. Consider a change in the 
above example where both A and B are part of prior art. The 
invention in this case is a combination of A and B, a combination 
that was not obvious to a skilled person. Here, neither A nor B are 
“essential parts” of the invention"rather, the “essential part” is the 
combination. Consequently, the doctrine of equivalents can be 
applied to both A and B. This would be true even if B were not part 
of the prior art if had B been part of the prior art the combination 
would still be non-obvious. The advantage of this proposal is that it 
is both simple and predictable, because the claim has clear 
elements where the specification does not. 
 
D.  Conclusion 
Between the Ball Spline decision and August 2002, there 
were 115 cases in which the doctrine of equivalent was invoked. 
Of these cases, the doctrine was applied and affirmed only in nine 
cases, which translates roughly to a mere 7.8% of the total cases 
where the doctrine was invoked. In other words, the court rejected 
the application of this doctrine in 92.2% of the cases.183 The main 
reason underlying the aversion of the Japanese lower courts 
towards applying the doctrine of equivalents is that the “essential 
part” requirement is unclear. Had the “essential part” requirement 
                                                
 
182 See Hanrei Kaisetsu, supra note 154, at 140 n.4. 
183 See Ball Spline Tables, supra note 162. 
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not existed, the doctrine of equivalents could have been applied to 
many more cases.  
The current definition most relied on by courts seems to be 
based on the “all elements rule.” But Hanrei Kaisetsu argues that 
the “essential part” requirement is the same as the “identity as a 
technological idea” concept, which in turn is substantially similar 
to the “an invention as a whole” concept.184 As a result of this 
theoretical confusion, the lower court decisions are a kind of a 
strange mixture of the “essential part” doctrine similar to the “all 
elements rule” on the one hand and the “identity as a technological 
idea” doctrine (and thereby the “an invention as a whole”) on the 
other. 
As highlighted above, an en banc (Grand Bench) decision 
of the Supreme Court of Japan is necessary to change the Ball 
Spline decision which mandates an “essential part” requirement. 
This is very difficult and the Congress is not likely to act in the 
near future. The “essential part” requirement is therefore here to 
stay for some time. 
An optimal way to limit the adverse effects of the “essential 
part” requirement is to define it as clearly and objectively as 
possible, so as to provide for more predictability in the application 
of the doctrine of equivalents. From this viewpoint, the author’s 
proposal for defining the ‘essential part’ requirement is a robust 
one. It is hoped that future decisions would take the simple 
definition proposed in this paper into account. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION: WORKING WITH KIRIN-AMGEN 
HYPOTHETICALS 
If one applies the laws of each jurisdiction to a classic 
example of a trivial change in a device—for instance, replacing a 
conical cavity for carrying coal with a pyramidal cavity that has 
the exact same purpose and effect of evenly distributing the weight 
of the coal with a low center of gravity—these jurisdictions will 
not significantly differ.  A U.S. court would, and did, find the 
device to be an infringing equivalent.185  A U.K. court would likely 
find that such a change was obvious at the date of publication and 
that the patentee did not intend the term “conical” to only apply to 
rounded cavities.  A German court would likely conclude that the 
teaching of the patent—that the conical cavity is designed to result 
in an even weight distribution of coal—meant that a person skilled 
in the art would have taken the embodiment into account as an 
                                                
 
184 See Hanrei Kaisetsu, supra note 154, at 140 n.4. 
185 Winans v. Deadmead, 56 U.S. 330, 343 (1854). 
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equivalent solution, and a Japanese court would find the change 
inessential and obviously equivalent to one skilled in the art.186 
That these jurisdictions would give the same answer to the 
question of infringement for such a simple case, however, does not 
mean that their solutions to the question of equivalents are the 
same.  For a true comparison, these solutions must be applied to a 
more complex situation. One of the best ways to understand the 
doctrine of equivalence and the various approaches to it is 
therefore to work with the facts of Kirin-Amgen. It involved one of 
the most famous inventions of the biotech era, the identification of 
the gene coding for human erythropoietin upon which Amgen built 
one of the largest biotechnology companies in the world. The key 
to the Amgen invention was that Amgen was able to isolate the 
gene coding for human erythropoietin.187 Once Amgen had the 
gene, then it was routine, but not easy, to insert the gene into 
Chinese hamster ovary (CHO) cells and get those cells to make 
human erythropoietin.188 This invention, made in the early 1980s, 
was held not to be obvious by the Federal Circuit in 1991, Amgen 
Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co.
189 At the time of the invention, 
the only known method of using an isolated gene to make its 
corresponding protein was to insert the isolated gene into a cell. 
The cell might well be termed a “host cell” for the gene came from 
outside the cell. A few years later a new technology initiated the 
era of gene activation. Instead of inserting a gene into a cell in 
order to have the cell manufacture the protein coded by the gene, 
gene activation technology activates human cells to make 
erythropoietin on their own.190 After all, every human cell already 
contains the gene that codes for all human proteins. As applied to 
erythropoietin, once one can locate the erythropoietin gene within 
the genome of the cell then the new gene activation technique 
employs a promoter that it inserted into the human cells which 
turns the cell’s erythropoietin genes on thereby causing the cells to 
make human erythropoietin.191 With the advent of this new gene 
activation technology, the U.K. courts encountered the issue of 
                                                
 
186 A separate issue may present itself if one thinks the patent drafter in this 
situation should have drafted his claims to literally cover this embodiment.  
However, the discussion of this problem is outside the bounds of this Article.  In 
any event, it is reasonable to assume that sloppy drafting cannot account for all 
equivalents that do not involve after-arising technology, inventive steps, or 
essential elements, and therefore, for these simple cases, these jurisdictions 
overlap.  
187 Kirin-Amgen v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd., [2004] UKHL 46, [2005] 
R.P.C. 9, ¶ 8. 
188 Id. ¶ 9. 
189 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
190 Kirin-Amgen, [2004] UKHL 46, ¶ 9. 
191 Id. ¶ 6. 
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whether the cell that receives a promoter to make its own human 
erythropoietin may be called a “host cell.” After all that cell did 
not receive the human erythropoietin gene isolated by Amgen, but 
it did receive a promoter from outside the cell. Nevertheless, the 
House concluded that it was not a “host cell” and the House made 
it abundantly clear that this is where it felt the analysis should 
end.192 
Arguably Kirin-Amgen on the facts was an easy case since 
the invention was finding the erythropoietin gene using two probes 
in a library of genes, a method of discovery that was viewed as an 
inventive step.193 The gene activation technology did not require 
copies of the actual gene as did the standard method disclosed in 
the patent, but it did need knowledge of its nucleic acid sequence 
in order to put the exogenous promoter in the right place with 
respect to the erythropoietin gene that was already in the genome 
of the cell. It is easy to see that this was not enough to convince a 
court that the accused process should be considered an 
infringement. But what if a different inventor invented a machine 
which could do the same thing with an exogenous gene as the 
CHO cells of the patent? The new machine could be the subject of 
many of its own patents. What if one could not reasonably foresee 
the invention of such a machine so the patent drafter did not see a 
need for using a broader term than “host cell,” such as “means for 
making a protein upon the receipt of a gene coding for said 
protein?” Would the House of Lords have been so quick to reject 
the need for a doctrine of equivalents? How would such a situation 
be treated by other courts? 
Clearly if the invention of such a machine was not 
reasonably foreseeable, then it likely would in the United States be 
considered an infringement when substituted for a CHO cell.194 
Similarly in Japan it should be clear that the CHO cell was not an 
essential feature since CHO cell lines were conventional 
technology at the time of Amgen’s invention. The situation in 
Germany would be different because when the specification was 
read by one skilled in the art at the time the patent issued, the 
skilled man would not envision substituting a host machine for a 
host cell.  
Changing the hypothetical ever so slightly is even more 
illuminating. Let us assume that at the time the claims were drafted 
the host machine technology was just being developed. It worked 
but was quite expensive and no commercial process was possible 
                                                
 
192 Id. ¶ 58. 
193 Id. ¶ 117. 
194 Unless, of course, the nature of the after-arising technology meant that the 
“way” part of the doctrine of equivalents test was not satisfied. 
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with such a host machine. After the patent issued a major change 
was made to the machine which rendered it a practical substitute 
for mammalian cells in the production of proteins from exogenous 
genes. At that point many in the biotech industry switched to this 
new machine technology.  
In the United States if there were no estoppel, this new host 
machine would most likely be viewed as an equivalent. If, 
however, there was an estoppel with respect to the “host cell” 
limitation, then the picture is cloudier as it can fairly be argued that 
the idea of a host machine was reasonably foreseeable as a 
substitute for host cells even though the existing host machine did 
not work very well. In the United Kingdom there of course would 
be no infringement. In Germany the question would be whether the 
existence of a poorly functioning host machine would be enough to 
convince one of skill in the art that the claim was meant to cover 
host machines. Then the newly improved host machine of the 
accused process would simply be a dependent (improvement) 
invention on the invention covered by the claim. In Japan the 
question would still turn on the essential/nonessential distinction 
but the likely result would again be infringement. It is for the 
reader to answer then the question of whether any of these 
jurisdictions have it right. 
There is some consensus that the narrowly read, literal 
meaning of the words of a claim is not enough to protect inventors 
against theft of their invention. However, the solution to this 
problem, the doctrine of equivalents, is by no means clear cut, and 
has thus developed quite differently in different jurisdictions. 
The United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and 
Germany each provide us with a different approach to the doctrine 
of equivalents. The United States arguably provides the broadest 
protection under the doctrine, counting foreseeable equivalents as 
infringing so long as they are not equivalent to an amended aspect 
of a claim, and unforeseeable equivalents as always infringing—
with the caveat that unforeseeable equivalents have difficulty 
passing the “way” aspect of the equivalents test. The United 
Kingdom does not consider itself to have a doctrine of equivalents; 
rather, it conducts a similar analysis under purposive claim 
construction.  This analysis may or may not find an unforeseeable, 
after-arising technology encompassed in the claim, depending on 
the generality of the language of the claim. An unforeseeable (or 
foreseeable) equivalent that cannot be found within the meaning of 
the language of a claim cannot infringe. This requirement may 
place too much of an expectation on the drafters of a claim, 
without giving significantly more guidance on patent scope. 
Japanese law allows for foreseeable and unforeseeable equivalents 
by basing its test of interchangeability on the time of manufacture 
THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS IN VARIOUS PATENT REGIMES—DOES 
ANYBODY HAVE IT RIGHT? 
 308 
of the accused device, but offers another way to narrow application 
of the doctrine: if the variant employed constitutes an essential part 
of the claim, then the accused device does not infringe. This 
requirement has injected much confusion into the application of 
the doctrine of equivalents in Japan. In contrast, Germany has 
declared that its test for equivalents be based on a specialist’s 
knowledge at the time of priority, and therefore has established a 
clear doctrine of equivalents that does not cover unforeseeable 
equivalents or suffer from other major problems. Should the 
doctrine of equivalents be broad enough to include unforeseeable 
equivalents? Is such an inclusion worthwhile if it brings 
uncertainty to the doctrine, or renders protection too broad? Is 
foreseeability even the correct line to draw, or should the doctrine 
focus on an essential/inessential distinction? It is for the reader to 
answer the question of whether any of these jurisdictions have it 
right. 
